OMG! ESD Codified!: The Overreaction to Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine by Armstrong, Monica D
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 9
Number 1 Celebrating Our Legacy Article 6
Fall 2013
OMG! ESD Codified!: The Overreaction to
Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine
Monica D. Armstrong
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Monica D. Armstrong, OMG! ESD Codified!: The Overreaction to Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 9 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev.
(2013).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol9/iss1/6
OMG! ESD CODIFIED!: THE OVERREACTION





The year was 1928. Mrs. G, the sole shareholder of Y Corpora-
tion (Y), desired a certain piece of property owned by Y. The most
efficient way to obtain the property was a direct transfer from Y to
Mrs. G. However, Mrs. G's tax advisor warned her that a direct distri-
bution of the property from Y would result in a significant tax liability.
This proved to be a conundrum for Mrs. G. She told her advisor, in no
uncertain terms, that she wanted the property but did not want to pay
an exorbitant tax.
The tax advisor explained to Mrs. G that in order to achieve her
objectives she must direct Y to form a new corporation. Y would then
transfer the desired property to the new corporation and the new cor-
poration would transfer all of its shares to Mrs. G. (making Mrs. G the
sole shareholder of both corporations). Immediately after the exchange
of the property and the shares-which would take no more than four
days-the new corporation would liquidate and distribute to Mrs. G
the desired property. By conducting the transaction in this roundabout
way Mrs. G could get her desired property and, more importantly, a
lower tax liability.
Mrs. G's skepticism caused her to ask the obvious question: "Is
this legal?" The advisor responded with enthusiasm and conviction, "Of
course it's legal. It's authorized by the Internal Revenue Code!"'
* Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Anthony Baldwin, Mercer University School of Law and Professor Gail Richmond,
Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University for their very helpful comments
and suggestions.
1. For those who are familiar with the case of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935), you may have noticed that I changed the scenario ever so slightly.
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The Economic Substance Doctrine
Throughout the years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
the courts have employed a number of judicial doctrines to prevent tax-
payers from manipulating the tax code and relying on a literal
interpretation of the tax provisions to obtain tax benefits unintended
by the statute. The economic substance doctrine is one such doctrine.2
The economic substance doctrine is one that disallows claimed tax ben-
efits3 if the transaction related to the said benefit does not change the
taxpayer's financial position and/or lacks a business purpose. 4 This
doctrine shall apply despite the fact that the transaction may meet all
requirements of the Code provision under which the taxpayer is claim-
ing the tax benefit.5
After many attempts,6 on March 25, 2010, Congress passed a
bill codifying the economic substance doctrine. The bill was enacted
into law as part of the Health Care and Education Affordability Recon-
ciliation Act of 20107 that was signed by President Barack Obama on
2. Other similar judicial doctrines include the business purpose doctrine; the step-
transaction doctrine; sham transaction; and substance over form. For a full discussion of
these doctrines see Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 CAL. L. REv. 5
(2000).
3. E.g., tax deductions, tax credits, net operating loss carryovers, etc.
4. I purposely use "and/or" because some courts disallowed the transaction when just
one of the two factors were not met, while other courts disallowed the transaction only when
the taxpayer failed to meet both factors. This split in authority is one of the purposes behind
codification-to provide a uniform rule.
5. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("[T]he economic substance doctrine is merely a judicial tool for effectuating the underlying
Congressional purpose that, despite literal compliance with the statute, tax benefits not be
afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance."), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206
(2007).
6. This was ten years in the making. Codification of the economic substance doctrine
was first introduced in 1999 by Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) in "The Abusive Tax Shelter
Shutdown Act of 1999. H.R. 2255 106th Cong.; it was reintroduced almost every year until it
finally became law in 2010. See Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 2001, H.R. 2520,
107th Cong. (2001); The Tax Haven and Abusive Tax Shelter Act of 2002, S. 2339, 107th
Cong. (2002); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520; Highway Reauthorization and
Excise Simplification Act of 2005, P.L. 109-82; 2007: Food and Energy Act of 2007, H.R.
2419, 110th Congress; The Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, & Horticulture Act of 2007, S.
2242; 2007: Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970. "The codification of the
economic substance doctrine had been stoutly resisted by the [Bush] Administration out of
concern that the proposal would reduce the courts' ability to use the economic substance
doctrine to address taxpayer abuses." Richard M. Lipton, 'Codification' of the Economic
Substance Doctrine-Much Ado About Nothing, ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials,
Creative Tax Planning for Real Estate Transactions, Volume 1, November 2010.
7. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010).
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March 30, 2010. Specifically, Section 14098 codified the economic sub-
stance doctrine by adding Section 7701(o) to the Code. Among other
things, Section 7701(o) provides a two-part conjunctive test to deter-
mine whether a transaction has economic substance.
Section 7701(o) provides:
In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doc-
trine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having
economic substance only if (A) the transaction changes in a mean-
ingful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's
economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose
(apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such a
transaction.
Unlike the judicial definition where some courts found a transaction to
have economic substance when there existed a business purpose or a
change in the taxpayer's economic position, Section 7701(o) requires
both-a change in the taxpayer's economic position and business pur-
pose-in order for a transaction to have economic substance. Thus, all
courts must determine: (1) whether the transaction entered into by the
taxpayer changed his economic position "in a meaningful way" without
tax considerations and (2) whether the taxpayer had a substantial non-
tax purpose in entering into the transaction. If the answer to both in-
quiries is yes, the transaction will be respected and the taxpayer shall
be entitled to the claimed tax benefit. On the other hand, if the trans-
action fails one of the prongs, it fails the economic substance test and
the claimed tax benefit will be disallowed.
Failing the economic substance test under Section 7701(o) will
result in more than the denial of a claimed tax benefit. The taxpayer
whose transaction fails the two-prong conjunctive test will also be sub-
ject to a tax penalty.9 The amount of the penalty is 20% of the tax
underpayment, i.e., the amount the taxpayer saved as a result of the
claimed tax benefit.10 The penalty increases to 40% for transactions
that are not disclosed on the taxpayer's tax return." To add insult to
injury-at least in the eyes of the taxpayer-the penalty is not subject
8. Id.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(6). The penalty applies to "[any disallowance of claimed tax
benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance (within the meaning of
section 7701(o) or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law." Section
6662(b)(6) is a new Code provision added under the same Act as section 7701(o). P.L. 111-
147.
10. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a). The underpayment penalty will also apply to "any
disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance"
(within the meaning of section 7701(o)). 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(6).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(i)(1).
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to the reasonable cause exception. 12 In other words, a transaction fail-
ing the economic substance test results in a strict liability penalty.
Congress' objectives in codifying the economic substance doc-
trine were to provide a uniform test for economic substance13 and also
to raise revenue.14 A third objective, while not explicitly stated in the
recently enacted legislation, aimed to curb tax motivated transac-
tions.15 Despite these positive objectives, certain groups engaged in
letter writing campaigns to the Treasury and the IRS in an uproar over
codification.16 These groups argue that Section 7701(o) is vague as to
the types of transactions that are subject to the economic substance
test; they assert that such vagueness will result in taxpayer uncer-
tainty,17 thereby creating a chilling effect on future business
12. 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1) allows the taxpayer to escape a tax penalty if he can show
reasonable cause for the underpayment and that he acted in good faith. However, section
6664(c)(1) does not apply to transactions lacking economic substance. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6664(c)(2).
13. Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the
President's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal; Part Two: Business Tax Provisions (JCS-3-
09), September 2009 ("There is a lack of uniformity regarding the proper tests to use when
applying the economic substance doctrine."); Alison Bennett, Tax Shelters Economic
Substance Doctrine to be Prominent Issue for IRS, Courts, Congress, 10 DTR S-18 (2010)
(quoting IRS Chief Counsel William Wilkins, "It clears up some different approaches in the
circuits and clarifies some of the standards.").
14. Section 7701(o) was estimated to bring in $657 million in revenue in the year of
enactment, 2010; 3.527 billion by 2014; and 8.120 billion by 2020. See Joint Committee on
Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's
Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal as Described by the Department of the Treasury, May
2009, (JCX-28-09), June 11, 2009.Earlier estimates predicted revenues of $17 billion by
2020. See Jeremiah Coder, The Journey to Codify Economic Substance is Over, But Will It
Be Worth It, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 61-1.
15. See, e.g., Tax Haven & Abusive Shelter Reform Act of 2002, 148 Cong. Rec. S2339
(One of the objectives was to end "meaningless and abusive tax transactions" by, among
other things, codifying the economic substance doctrine); Jumpstart Our Business Strength
Act (JOBS) (The Committee Report provided as one of the reasons for codification was
because it was "concerned that many taxpayers [were] engaging in tax avoidance
transactions that rely on the interaction of highly technical tax law provisions").
16. See PWC Seeks Quick Action From Treasury, IRS to Mitigate Uncertainty Created
by Economic Substance Codification, 2010 TAX NoTEs TODAY 79-117 (April 22, 2010)
[hereinafter PWC]; see also 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 86-19: Practitioners Want More Specifics
on Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, May 2, 2011(Doc. 2011-9441).
17. See, e.g., PWC, supra note 16 ("The new law raises a number of issues with respect
to the economic substance doctrine, simultaneously increasing taxpayer uncertainty around
when and how the doctrine is to be applied."); Allison Bennett, Codification Would Create
More Problems Than it Solves, Says Korb, 118 TAX NOTES TODAY 777 (Feb. 18, 2008)
(quoting Former IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb, "What we are going to have is less
aggressive taxpayers not going forward with transactions maybe they otherwise should [go
forward with], while the more aggressive who understand how the system works may just
plow right ahead.").
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transactions' 8 due to fear of the strict liability tax penalty that will be
imposed if they fail the test. Therefore, those opposed have urged the
Treasury and IRS to (1) provide guidance (an angel list) on the types of
transaction that are subject to the economic substance doctrine; (2) de-
fine certain terms within the statute, such as "meaningful change in
the taxpayer's economic position" and "substantial nontax purpose,"
and (3) reconsider the strict liability tax penalty.' 9
The purpose of this article is to counter the numerous articles
that have unfairly represented Section 7701(o) as a doomsday statute
for taxpayers and business transactions. This article shall respond to
the critics through an analysis of Section 7701(o), focusing on its par-
ticular words, phrases, and terms of art with which the critics take
issue. In addition, it addresses the fears that opponents of codification
have expressed that the newly added statute will affect many legiti-
mate transactions that may fall victim to the strict liability tax
penalty. To be clear, this is not an article touting the wonders of codifi-
cation of the economic substance doctrine. As with anything, there is
always room for improvement. This article is designed to show that the
negative way in which Section 7701(o) has been portrayed is un-
founded and exaggerated.
Part II of this article begins with an in-depth discussion of the
development of the economic substance doctrine by the United States
Supreme Court. Part III provides a brief discussion of the problem in
applying the economic substance test among the different circuits. Said
problem became one of the objectives for codification-to provide con-
sistency and certainty in the application of the economic substance
doctrine. Part IV, the heart of the article, addresses the concerns critics
have with respect to section 7701(o).
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
Three U.S. Supreme Court cases have been credited with the
creation and shaping of today's economic substance doctrine: (1) Greg-
ory v. Helvering,20 (2) Knetsch v. United States,21 and (3) Frank Lyon
18. See PWC, supra note 16.
19. See id. ("Due to the severity of the penalty and the inapplicability of the reasonable
cause defense, it is absolutely critical that taxpayers be provided with a process for
establishing certainty with respect to a transaction prior to engaging in the transaction.
[Tiaxpayers should be entitled to a pre-transaction ruling process . . .
20. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
21. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
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Co. v. United States.22 All three cases stand for the broad principle that
mere compliance with the tax provision will not automatically entitle a
taxpayer to the tax benefits in which he seeks. In addition, they re-
present the components of today's economic substance test now found
in Section 7701(o). Specifically, Gregory is linked to the requirement
that the transaction must serve a business purpose, 23 while Knetsch is
associated with the requirement that the transaction "meaningfully
change the taxpayer's economic position." Frank Lyon extracted those
two principles and articulated the first test for economic substance.
A. Gregory v. Helvering
Many credit Gregory as the birth of today's economic substance
doctrine. 24 There are, however, a few who disagree. 25 Whether Gregory
is the source of today's economic substance doctrine or not, it cannot be
disputed that the facts of the case present a perfect example of the
purpose of the doctrine.
Mrs. Gregory was the sole shareholder of United Mortgage Cor-
poration (UMC), which held 1000 shares of stock as one of its assets in
Monitor Securities Corporation (Monitor).26 Mrs. Gregory wanted the
cash value of those shares and could have easily accomplished such
with UMC selling the Monitor shares to a third party and distributing
22. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
23. But see Leandra Lederman, (W)hither Economic Substance, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 389,
391 ("[TIhe business purpose requirement dates to the landmark case of [Gregory], but in
that case, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit merely interpreted the governing
statute as implicitly requiring a business purpose.. . . Over the years, the business purpose
requirement has been distorted, resulted in analyses that make little sense."); Jerome B.
Libin, Congress Should Address Tax Avoidance Head-on: The Internal Revenue Code Needs
a GAAR, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 339, 343 ("[T~he requirement of 'business purpose' enunciated in
Gregory was not intended as some sort of new, free-form judicial doctrine . . . .").
24. "The origins of the economic substance doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)." Palm Canyon X Investments,
LLC v. C.I.R., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (T.C. 2009); see also Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44, 52
("Per Gregory v Helvering, it is settled federal law that for transactions to be recognized for
tax purposes they must have economic substance"); "ACM, p. 246 ("We begin our economic
analysis with Gregory v. Helvering. . ."); Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1490 ("The
sham transaction doctrine emerged from the Supreme Court decision in Gregory v.
Helvering."); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 Tax Law
235 (Winter 1999), ("The economic substance doctrine was, if not formulated, then at least
popularized by Learned Hand in the Second Circuit's 1934 decision of Gregory v.
Helvering".).
25. "Nowhere in the court's opinion, the facts of the case, or anywhere else is there any
suggestion that the transaction devised by Mrs. Gregory and her tax advisors failed because
it lacked economic substance." 30 VA. TAx REV. 339. See also Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither
Economic Substance, 95 IowA L. REV. 389.
26. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
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the cash back to Mrs. Gregory. However, that plan would have resulted
in tax consequences to both UMC and Mrs. Gregory.27 If instead UMC
distributed the stock directly to Mrs. Gregory, the corporate level tax
would be eliminated 28; however, the distribution would still result in a
taxable dividend to Mrs. Gregory in the amount of $133,333.33.29
Wishing to avoid a taxable dividend, but still desiring the cash pro-
ceeds from the sale of the stock, Mrs. Gregory (no doubt with the aid of
tax advisors) devised a plan that would allow her to meet those
objectives.
B. Tax Plan (or Tax Scheme) and Resulting Tax
Consequences Under the Code
On September 18, 1928, UMC created Averill Corporation
(Averill) and two days later, UMC transferred the Monitor shares to
Averill. In return for the Monitor shares, Averill transferred all of its
own shares of stock to Mrs. Gregory, thereby making her its sole share-
holder.3 0 The formation of Averill Corporation was a corporate
reorganization 31 and since Mrs. Gregory received the Averill shares
through a corporate reorganization, she would not have a taxable
gain. 32 However, the tax laws required Mrs. Gregory to allocate part of
her cost basis in the UMC stock to the Averill stock.33 This resulted in
a basis in the Averill stock of $57,325.45.34 On September 22, 1928,
four-day old Averill liquidated and distributed the Monitor stock, val-
ued at $133,333.33, to Mrs. Gregory. Mrs. Gregory treated the receipt
of the Monitor stock as a sale or exchange. Offsetting the $133,333.33
27. The corporation would be subject to an income on the gain from the sale of the stock
and Mrs. Gregory would be subject to a dividends tax.
28. See General Utilities v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). In 1928, when the
transaction occurred, the tax law at the time allowed corporations to distribute appreciated
property (including stock) to their shareholders without incurring a tax. This generous tax
law was repealed with the enactment of I.R.C. § 311(b) in 1986.
29. Gregory v. Helvering, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932).
30. Id.
31. Under section 112(i) of the Revenue Act of 1928. Pursuant to Section 112(i)(1),
reorganization includes a transfer of assets by one corporation to another corporation and
after the transfer, the stockholders control both the transferor corporation and the
transferee corporation.
32. Pursuant to section 112(g) of the 1928 Revenue Act. Section 112(g) provides that no
gain shall be recognized by a shareholder who receives stock pursuant to a corporate
reorganization.
33. Section 113(a)(9) the Revenue Act of 1928. UMC purchased a total of 5000 shares
on two separate occasions, October 1, 1920 and December 16, 1921 for a total cost of
$250,000. 27 B.T.A. at 224.
34. Id.
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value of the Monitor stock against the $57,325.45 basis in her Averill
stock, Mrs. Gregory would report a capital gain of $76,007.88.35 The
transaction allowed Mrs. Gregory to save $10,678.16 in income taxes.36
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) re-
jected Mrs. Gregory's treatment of the transaction, determining that
the transaction lacked substance and was entered into solely for tax
avoidance purposes. 7 Consequently, the Commissioner disregarded
the reorganization and taxed the distribution of the Monitor stock as a
dividend.38
C. Courts' Decisions
The Board of Tax Appeals sided with Mrs. Gregory's tax treat-
ment of the transaction stating:
[A] statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal
expression of the taxing policy, and leaves only the small interstices
for judicial consideration. The general legislative plan apparently
was to recognize the corporate entity and, in view of such recogni-
tion, to specify when the gains or losses would be recognized and
upon what basis they should be measured. We may not destroy the
effectiveness of this statutory plan by denying recognition to the
corporation and thus preventing consideration of its transaction.39
The Board reasoned that since Mrs. Gregory complied with the appli-
cable code provisions-regardless of how she went about it-her
treatment of the receipt of the Monitor stock as a sale or exchange was
proper. As a result, the Board held, such sale resulted in a capital gain
of $76,007.88.40
On appeal the Second Circuit, while sanctioning a taxpayer's
attempt to avoid or reduce taxes as permitted under the law, disagreed
with the Board's literal interpretation of the reorganization tax provi-
sion. Judge Learned Hand, the author of the opinion, admonished:
[I]t does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction,
not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each
term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the Board
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 225. As the Second Circuit aptly put it, the Commissioner's position on Mrs.
Gregory's transaction was "merely the declaration of a dividend by the United Mortgage
Corporation consisting of the Monitor shares in specie, on which the taxpayer must pay a
surtax calculated at their full value." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 822 (2d Cir. 1934).
38. Id. at 224.
39. Id. at 225-226.
40. Id. at 226.
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THE OVERREACTION TO CODIFICATION
has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases,
the room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sen-
tence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is
more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate
recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collec-
tively create. The purpose of the section is plain enough; men
engaged in enterprises - industrial, commercial, financial, or any
other - might wish to consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract
from, their holdings. Such transactions were not to be considered as
"realizing" any profit, because the collective interests still remained
in solution. But the underlying presupposition is plain that the re-
adjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct
of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to
its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is not one of the
transactions contemplated as corporate "reorganizations."4 1
Thus, instead of a textualist approach, the Second Circuit adopted a
purposive interpretation finding the intention of the reorganization tax
provision relied on by Mrs. Gregory was not for the reduction of taxes,
the sole reason for Mrs. Gregory's transaction. The Court of Appeals
found that the reduction or avoidance of taxes did not fall within the
purview of the reorganization tax provisions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, specifically
finding that Mrs. Gregory's transaction was in pursuance of a plan to
reduce her taxes which "[had] no business or corporate purpose," which
it determined to be a prerequisite for corporate reorganizations.42 It
held for the Government, for to hold otherwise, it explained, would be
to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in
question of all serious purpose."43
D. Knetsch v. United States
In 1953, 60-year old Knetsch purchased ten 30-year annuity
savings bonds (bonds) for $4,004,000 from Sam Houston Life Insurance
Company (Sam Houston).44 To finance the purchase, borrowed $4 mil-
41. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11.
42. 293 U.S. at 469-70 (The Court saw the transaction as "a mere device which put on
the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the
sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not
to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate
shares to the petitioner. . . . [The] corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the
end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it
was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited
function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death") (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 470.
44. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 363.
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lion dollars from Sam Houston and contributed $4,000 of his own
money.45 At maturity, the value of the annuity would be $8,388,000
entitling Mr. Knetsch to a monthly payment of $90,171 for life. 46 While
the contract obligated Knetsch to prepay the interest, it allowed him to
borrow against the net value of the bonds and use the borrowed funds
to prepay the interest on the original loan. 4 7 Taking advantage of the
generous terms, Knetsch borrowed $99,000 of the bonds' net value of
$100,000 in the first year of the contract and prepaid the interest on
the original $4 million loan and the second ($99,000) loan. In total,
Knetsch paid Sam Houston $143,465 in purported interest payments
whereby he claimed an interest deduction48 in that same amount on
his 1953 Federal income tax return.4 9
In 1954, Knetsch borrowed all but $1,000 of the net value of the
bonds, $104,000, to prepay the interest on his now $4,099,000 indebt-
edness and brand new $104,000 obligation. Knetsch paid a total of
$147,105 to the insurance company and, as in 1953, claimed an inter-
est deduction of $147,105 on his 1954 income tax return.5 0 Knetsch
continued borrowing against the bonds' value for another two years,
after which he terminated the contract.51 If Knetsch had continued to
borrow all but $1,000 of the cash value of the bonds until maturity the
bonds would have been worth only $1,000 and Knetsch, who would
have been ninety at the time, would be entitled to a mere $43 a
month. 52
The large interest deductions perhaps are what initially caught
the eye of the Commissioner. Viewing the transaction as economic
shams, he disallowed the deductions. Both the District Court and
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the Commissioner's determi-
nation.53 The Supreme Court, after analyzing the transaction, 54
determined it to be a sham, which "did not appreciably affect
45. Id.
46. Id. at 364.
47. Id. at 362.
48. Id. (pursuant to I.R.C. § 23(b) (1939)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 362 (the code provision allowing the deduction was pursuant to § 163(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
51. Id. at 362-64 (Knetsch continued to borrow against the cash surrender value for
two more years and taking interest deductions on the prepaid interest. He terminated the
contract in 1956).
52. Id. at 364.
53. See Knetsch v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9935 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
("While in form the payments to [the insurance company] were compensation for the use or
forbearance of money, they were not in substance a payment of interest, the transaction was
a sham;"); 272 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1959).
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[Knetsch's] beneficial interest, except to reduce his tax,"66 i.e., it did
not meaningfully change his economic position.
E. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States
Worthen Bank & Trust Company (Worthen) planned to con-
struct an office building which would cost approximately $9 million.
Worthen wanted to finance the project by offering $4 million in deben-
tures of one of its subsidiaries and borrowing the remaining $5 million
from a local bank. However, Worthen could not use either financial de-
vice. First, state banking laws in Arkansas prohibited Worthen, a
state-owned bank, from paying interest on the debentures at the rate
that would attract investors. Second, the Federal Reserve would not
authorize Worthen to borrow $5 million from a bank due to insufficient
capital stock and surplus.56
Enter taxpayer Frank Lyon, Inc. (Frank Lyon) to solve
Worthen's problem. Frank Lyon agreed to purchase the building for
$7,640,000, using $500,000 of its own money and borrowing the re-
maining amount ($7,140,000) from New York Life Insurance
Company.57 After purchasing the building, Frank Lyon leased it back
to Worthen for 25 years. Worthen had the option to purchase the build-
ing when the lease term ended for an amount equal to what Lyon had
already paid for the property and the assumption of the mortgage bal-
ance.5 8 As lessee Worthen would: (1) make lease payments totaling the
exact amount of Lyon's amortized mortgage payments; (2) pay all
building expenses; (3) be entitled to receive all insurance proceeds ex-
ceeding the mortgage balance in the event the building was damaged
or destroyed; and (4) be entitled to the $500,000 paid by the Frank
54. Knetsch, 364 US at 365-66. ("When we examine 'what was done' here, we see that
Knetsch paid the insurance company $ 294,570 during the two taxable years involved and
received $ 203,000 back in the form of 'loans.' What did Knetsch get for the out-of-pocket
difference of $ 91,570? In form he had an annuity contract with a so-called guaranteed cash
value at maturity of $ 8,388,000, which would produce monthly annuity payments of $
90,171, or substantial life insurance proceeds in the event of his death before maturity.
This, as we have seen, was a fiction, because each year Knetsch's annual borrowings kept
the net cash value, on which any annuity or insurance payments would depend, at the
relative pittance of $ 1,000. Plainly, therefore, Knetsch's transaction with the insurance
company did "not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax . . .
(citing Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (dissenting opinion)).
55. Id. at 366.
56. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563-64.
57. Id. at 564-66.
58. Id. at 566-67.
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Lyon.59 Even though Worthen bore the burdens and benefits of owner-
ship, Lyon, being the legal owner of the property, claimed depreciation
and interest deductions totaling $497,219.18.60 The Commissioner dis-
allowed the deductions re-characterizing the sale-and-leaseback
transaction as a financing arrangement whereby Worthen borrowed
$500,000 from Lyon and Lyon acted as an agent for the mortgage pay-
ments from Worthen to New York Life.61
The District Court considered the facts and found that the two
parties, Lyon and Worthen, intended to create a sale-and-leaseback
and did in fact create a sale-and-leaseback. Therefore, it rejected the
Commissioner's characterization of the transaction as a financing ar-
rangement holding that the deductions were allowable.62 However, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the Commissioner's view of
the arrangement and reversed the District Court's decision, stating:
In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens which [Lyon] has incurred
with respect to the Worthen building are simply too insubstantial to
establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes. . . . The
vice of the present lease is that all of [its] features have been em-
ployed in the same transaction with the cumulative effect of
depriving [Lyon] of any significant ownership interest.63
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, finding the
transaction to be a true sale-and-leaseback and articulated the follow-
ing rule:
Where .. . there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with eco-
nomic substance which is compelled by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless la-
bels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
and duties effectuated by the parties so long as the lessor retains
sufficient and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status,
the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax
purposes. 64
Thus, the sale-and-leaseback transaction was to be respected
because it: (1) had economic substance and (2) "business realities ...
imbued with tax-independent considerations," i.e. a non-tax business
purpose. This rule, which featured aspects of Gregory and Knetsch be-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 568.
61. Id. at 568-69.
62. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9545 (E.D. Ark 1975).
63. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1976).
64. Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 583-84 (1978). See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme
Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1075 (1981).
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came known as the economic substance test. However, this five-part
test was subsequently interpreted by the lower courts to create a two-
part test for determining whether a transaction lacks economic sub-
stance. However, as will be explained below, the application of the
economic substance test was not consistent among the circuits.
III. THE DIFFERENT CONSTRUCTIONS OF FRANK LYON'S
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE TEST
Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner65 was one of the first cases
to apply the economic substance test articulated in Frank Lyon.66 The
Tax Court construed Frank Lyon as a two-part disjunctive test and
held the taxpayer's transaction lacked economic substance because the
transaction had neither a business purpose nor a reasonable possibility
of a profit.67 In other words, if the transaction had either a business
purpose or a reasonable possibility of profit, the taxpayer would have
prevailed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's opinion and
also adopted its two-part disjunctive test.68 The Eighth Circuit also fol-
lowed the Tax Court's narrow interpretation of Frank Lyon's test for
economic substance test.69
As is often the case, there was another school of thought with
some of the other circuits on how to apply the economic substance test
enunciated in Frank Lyon. Those Circuits construed Frank Lyon, Inc.
as mandating a multi-part conjunctive test for economic substance.
Thus, the tax benefit would be allowable only if the transaction had a
65. Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983).
66. Earlier cases applying Frank Lyon include Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305
(1980), affd, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982); Belz Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
1209 (1979).
67. Rice's Toyota, 81 T.C. at 209.
68. See Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d 89, 91-2 (4th Cir. 1985)("The tax court read Frank Lyon
Co. v. United States to mandate a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether a transaction
is, for tax purposes, a sham. To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the
taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in
entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no
reasonable possibility of a profit exists. We agree that such a test properly gives effect to the
mandate of the Court in Frank Lyon.").
69. IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001) ("In determining
whether a transaction is a sham for tax purposes, the Eighth Circuit has applied a two-part
test set forth in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, which the Fourth Circuit
ostensibly found in the Supreme Court's opinion in Frank Lyon Co. Applying that test, a
transaction will be characterized as a sham if 'it is not motivated by any economic purpose
outside of tax considerations' (the business purpose test), and if it 'is without economic
substance because no real potential for profit exists' (the economic substance test).").
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business purpose and economic substance. 70 The remaining circuits,
while acknowledging Frank Lyon created a two-prong economic sub-
stance test, insisted that the Court never intended the test to be a
"rigid two-step analysis." Rather, business purpose and economic sub-
stance were to be treated as factors, along with other considerations,
when scrutinizing the substance of transaction.7'
The various tests applied by the courts resulted in (1) uncer-
tainty to the taxpayers (and by implication to the government and
courts); (2) costly litigation; and (3) more frustration for the Internal
Revenue Service in handling cases and the government in trying cases,
or so certain members of Congress believed. A uniform test for eco-
nomic substance, of course, would do the exact opposite-bring about
certainty to all parties involved; result in less litigation and more set-
tlements; and reduce the Revenue Agents' workload. Thus in March
2010, Congress codified the economic substance test adopting a two-
part conjunctive test for economic substance.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS' OVERREACTION TO SECTION 7701(o)
As discussed in Part III, the courts were inconsistent in apply-
ing the economic substance doctrine. Did codifying and adopting a two-
prong conjunctive test for economic substance cause harm to the eco-
nomic substance doctrine as the critics claim? Addressing that
question requires a breakdown of section 7701(o).
Section 7701(o) begins with the following statement: "In the
case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is
70. See, e.g., Iamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir.
2009) ("[I1f a transaction lacks economic substance compelled by business or regulatory
realities, the transaction must be disregarded even if the taxpayers profess a genuine
business purpose without tax-avoidance motivations"); Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990
F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The threshold question is whether the transaction has economic
substance. If the answer is yes, the question becomes whether the taxpayer was motivated
by profit to participate in the transaction"); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v Commissioner, 254
F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001) ("A transaction is not entitled to tax respect if it lacks
economic effects or substance other than the generation of tax benefits, or if the transaction
serves no business purpose.").
71. See, e.g., Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhis
circuit [has] found that the Court's holding in Frank Lyon was not intended to outline a
rigid two-step analysis. . . Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic
substance are simply more precise factors to consider in the application of [the] court's
traditional sham analysis."); James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1990)
("The better approach, in our view, holds that 'the consideration of business purpose and
economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider in the [determination of]
whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other than the creation of
income tax losses.'") See also Sochin v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988);
American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2003).
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relevant."72 So the obvious question is: What kind of transactions will
cause the economic substance doctrine to be relevant? Section
7701(o)(5)(C) provides: "[Tihe determination of whether the economic
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the
same manner as if section 7701(o) had never been enacted." However,
that Code section goes no further than that statement. It does not pro-
vide examples of transactions subject to the economic substance or
point to another Code provision or Treasury Regulation. In addition,
the Service announced that it would not provide a list of transactions
to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant or irrelevant.73
Nor will it issue private letter rulings or determination letters concern-
ing the relevancy of the economic substance doctrine to a particular
transaction.74 Moreover, there is no legislative history to section
7701(o) that may provide some insight as to what transactions are sub-
ject to section 7701(o). 75
While critics of codification viewed the scant guidance as an
egregious flaw in section 7701,76 it should be viewed as a deliberate
omission having no negative impact. As I will explain below, taxpayers
are not in the dark with respect to determining the type of transactions
that will invite an economic substance inquiry.
A. Transactions Subject to § 7701
"The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine
is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if
72. I.R.C. §7701(o) (Emphasis added.) (An earlier provision provided that a codified
economic substance doctrine would be applicable only where "a court determines that the
economic substance doctrine is relevant."" See Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification
Act of 2010, S. 3018, 111th Cong. §411 (2009)).
73. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 IRB 411.
74. Id.; see also IRS Issues Interim Guidance on Economic Substance , Doc. 2010-
20020, 2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 177-14.
75. There exists a Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) Report that provides some
guidance, however JCT Reports are not legislative history. See Hutchinson v.
Commissioner, 765 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1985).
76. "Major flaw in codification is not clarifying the transaction," NYBSA, Economic
Substance Codification, Tax Notes, June 23, 2003; "I have never seen such a vague word
used at the fulcrum of a statute. If the term is broadly construed, there is an endless
number of transactions subject to the doctrine, which is why the government needs to hew
to a narrower definition of relevance. Otherwise, every big tax case will have an economic
component." Jeremiah Coder, Determining Relevance of Economic Substance Doctrine is Not
Hard, Alexander Says, 2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 107-2 (quoting statement of David P.
Hariton of Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP); "[T]he existing ambiguity in the statute suggests a
broad reading of when the doctrine is applicable, that broadness 'just can't be where this
has gone."' (quoting statement of Karen Gilbreath Sowell of Ernst & Young LLP).
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section 7701(o) had never been enacted."7 7 Section 7701(o)(5)(C) is not
vague at all, it merely directs us back to case law. As the IRS Associate
Chief Counsel, William Alexander stated: "The language of section
7701(o) has a 'helpful hint' referencing the common law doctrine, so
practitioners should go back to old authorities. By using the terms 'rel-
evant' and 'common law' in the statute, it is apparent that Congress
made some effort to reference existing law."7 8
Research will reveal that the Service has only asserted the eco-
nomic substance doctrine on transactions that the Service considered
abusive or tax-motivated. Conveniently, those transactions are in-
cluded in a non-exhaustive list that the Service has deemed abusive or
tax Research will also reveal that the types of transactions where the
Service has asserted the economic substance doctrine possess certain
characteristics. Those characteristics include transactions that: (1) are
promoted or developed by tax departments or promoters; (2) have no
significant risk of loss; (3) are pre-packaged; (4) are outside the tax-
payer's ordinary course of business; (5) use various entities including
partnerships, LLC's, and trusts; (6) involve tax indifferent partners;
and (8) have no meaningful potential for profit; (9) are not at arm's
length with unrelated third parties; (10) are highly structured; and
(11) use unnecessary steps.79
A taxpayer whose transaction does not contain the characteris-
tics listed above should feel confident that he will not have to defend
his business decisions. In other words, he can rely on the implication
made under section 7701(o)(5)(C)-if the IRS did not consider the eco-
nomic substance doctrine relevant to run-of-the-mill transactions prior
to codification, then the economic substance doctrine will not be rele-
vant to those same transactions as a result of codification.
B. Specific Transactions Not Subject To § 7701
In spite of the Service's position that it will not provide an angel
list of transactions subject to § 7701, Notice 2010-62 does provide the
taxpayer with a little guidance regarding transactions that will not be
subject to the economic substance test. The Notice provides that the
economic substance doctrine will not apply if authorities, prior to en-
actment of section 7701(o), provided that the economic substance
doctrine was not relevant.80 Those transactions include (1) like-kind
77. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
78. Id.
79. See CARE Act, § 701 (draft language at section 7701(n)(3)(B)).
80. I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-2C.B. 411.
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exchanges under section 1031; (2) involuntary conversions under sec-
tion 1033; (3) corporate formations under section 351; (4) choosing
between debt or equity to capitalize a business entity; (5) the choice
between a domestic or foreign corporation for a foreign investment; (6)
structuring of a corporate reorganization; and (7) use of a related en-
tity in a transaction.81 In addition, cases factually similar to Cottage
Savings8 2 would be safe as well.
C. Is IRS Guidance Regarding What Transactions Are Subject to
§ 7701(o) Really Necessary?
Despite what I believe to be adequate guidance concerning
those transactions, "To which the economic substance doctrine is rele-
vant," there are many critics who will not be persuaded by my
arguments. Assuming arguendo that taxpayers are not clear as to what
transactions are subject to the economic substance doctrine and, as the
critics fear, all transactions could potentially be subject to section
7701(o)-other than those specifically excluded, I respond: So what?
Perhaps, it is a good idea to force businesses to consider the pur-
pose of their transaction prior to entering into it if they desire the tax
benefit. At least one court believed that Gregory implied economic sub-
stance as a prerequisite.83 Requiring all transactions to pass the
economic test would be no different than requiring all businesses to
substantiate their expenses. It would be a requirement that most
transactions will meet since the majority of taxpayers truly have non-
tax reasons for entering into a transaction. These run-of-the-mill
transactions will not even be given a second glance by the tax audi-
tors-at least with respect to the economic substance doctrine. The
81. See J. Comm. Staff Description of Bus. Tax Revenue Provisions, Budget Proposal,
(JCS-3-09 Sept. 2009). See also S. Rep. 110-206, 92-93; Technical Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions Contained in H.R. 3962, The "Affordable Health Care for America Act,"
as amended at 90-91 (JCX-47-9 Nov. 5, 2009).
82. In the Supreme Court case of Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991),
the taxpayer (a bank) exchanged mortgage portfolios, practically identical in nature, and
realized a loss from the transaction. The transaction was entered into for the sole purpose of
obtaining a deduction. The transaction had no business purpose and lacked any profit
potential. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court sustained the taxpayer's deduction finding that
Congress' intent under section 1001, and the accompanying regulations, included
accelerating losses in the way the taxpayer had done. The taxpayer in Cottage Savings,
realized an actual loss, unlike the artificial losses created in other transactions that
involved sales and exchanges of property.
83. See Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44, 52 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Per Gregory v. Helvering...
it is settled federal tax law that for transactions to be recognized for tax purposes they must
have economic substance. Therefore, economic substance is a prerequisite to the application
of any Code provisions allowing deductions.").
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Service does not have the time, interest, or money to scrutinize every
business transaction. To make it a requirement for every transaction to
pass the economic substance test does not mean every transaction will
be subject to an inquiry by the Service.
There would only be a minority of taxpayers who would need to
be concerned that their transactions will raise the eyebrows of the IRS
auditors; those are taxpayers whose transactions contain the charac-
teristics mentioned earlier.84 However, even with those transactions, it
is important to remember that just because the economic substance
doctrine is relevant to the transaction it does not necessarily mean it
will fail the test. Put another way, a transaction in which the economic
substance doctrine is relevant, does not in necessarily mean it is a tax-
motivated transaction. Consider Frank Lyon, it dealt with a transac-
tion that the Service thought was suspicious because of the unusual
way the taxpayer structured its transaction. 5 The Court found legiti-
mate reasons the taxpayer structured the transaction the way it did
and found the transaction to have economic substance.86 Thus, taxpay-
ers with this issue should understand that their transactions will be
scrutinized; therefore, they need to be prepared to defend their
position.
1. First Prong - Meaningful Change in a Taxpayer's
Economic Position
Upon a determination by the courts that the transaction is one
in which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, they will be put
to the task of applying the two-prong conjunctive economic substance
test. The first prong provides that the transaction must change the tax-
payer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from federal
income tax considerations.8 7 Critics of codification of the economic sub-
stance doctrine expressed dissatisfaction that neither the statute nor
the legislative history defined the term "meaningful."88
While the critics are correct, they ignore the fact that the term
"meaningful" does not become an issue unless the transaction actually
changes the taxpayer's economic position. In most economic substance
84. See CARE Act, § 701 (draft language at section 7701(n)(3)(B)).
85. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
86. Id.
87. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).
88. "There is scant legislative history explaining how the terms 'meaningful change,'
and 'economic position' are to be interpreted and applied." ABA Members Seek More
Guidance on Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 TAx NOTEs TODAY 12-
13.
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doctrine cases, the taxpayer's economic position has not changed at all.
Thus, the analysis should begin, and in most cases will end with
whether the transaction changed the taxpayer's economic position.
How a transaction changes a taxpayer's economic position can
be explained in the example below:
A gives B a government security in exchange for $1million. (In es-
sence, B is loaning A $1 million and B receives the government
security as collateral.) A agrees to repurchase the government se-
curity for $1 million plus interest on a specified date that is prior to
the date the government security matures. The amount of interest
A will be required to pay will be based on the going interest rate at
the time of repayment. Thus, the interest rate is not known at the
time of the transaction. If at the time A repurchases the govern-
ment security, i.e. repays the loan, A's government securities are
worth $900,000 and A pays $200,000 in interest (high interest rate
at 20%) A has lost $300,000 (A paid $1,200,000 and received back
$900,000).
On the other hand, if the value of the government securities is
worth $1.3 million and A pays back $1 million principal plus
$100,000 in interest (assuming a low interest rate of 10%), then A
gains $200,000 ($1,300,000 received less $1,100,000 paid).89
In both instances, notwithstanding income tax considerations,
the taxpayer's economic position has changed, negatively in the first
scenario and positively in the second. Since the above scenarios result
in a true economic change to the taxpayer's financial position, the in-
terest that the taxpayer paid on the deemed loan would entitle A to a
tax deduction.90 In other words, the transaction would be respected as
having economic substance, meaning the interest deduction would be
allowed.
However, one does not typically see the type of transaction in
the above examples in tax motivated transactions. In a tax motivated
transaction, where the government has invoked the economic sub-
stance doctrine, the taxpayer's financial position has not changed at all
and if so, only negligibly. Thus, the court never arrives at determining
whether the change in economic position was "meaningful", thereby
rendering such term meaningless. The following cases demonstrate
this position.
89. The example is based on the facts in United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117 (3d Cir.
1994) The transaction is a "Repo" which the sale of government securities by a securities
dealer to another which will be repurchased at a later time.
90. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 163(a).
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a. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner91
In ACM, the taxpayer purchased $175 million worth of Citicorp
notes for $175 million cash. Twenty-four days later ACM sold the Cit-
icorp notes and received $140 million in cash and LIBOR (London
Interbank Offered Rate) notes worth $35 million. Even the most math-
challenged person could figure out that ACM earned absolutely noth-
ing from the transaction. 92 However, by manipulating the contingent
installment sales and ratable basis recovery rules under § 453,93 the
taxpayer claimed a $32 million capital loss from the transaction and
offset it against capital gains in a related entity.94 The loss, not sur-
prisingly, was disallowed by the Commissioner. Both the Tax Court95
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Commissioner's de-
termination. While the Court of Appeals acknowledged ACM's receipt
of interest payments from the Citicorp notes, it found that they did
"not have a material effect on ACM's financial position because the
notes paid interest at a rate that varied only nominally from the rate
that ACM's $175 million was already earning in deposit accounts
before the notes were acquired."96 In other words, the court found that
the transactions with respect to the Citicorp notes left ACM in the
same position it had occupied before engaging in the offsetting acquisi-
tion and disposition of those notes.97
b. Lerman v. Commissioner98 (Disposition of property
resulting in an actual loss)
While ACM involved a disposition of property, which produced a
paper loss, Lerman involved dispositions of property that resulted in
actual losses. In Lerman, the taxpayer engaged in option-straddle
transactions.9 9 Essentially, the taxpayer engaged in related transac-
tions spanning two years. In the first year, the taxpayer realized a loss
91. ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 231 (disposition of property resulting in a paper loss).
92. "The court noted that ACM sold the Citicorp notes 'for consideration equal to [their]
purchase price' and thus did not realize any gain or loss in the notes' principal value." ACM
P'ship, 157 F.3d at 249 (citing 73 T.C.M. at 2215 n. 19).
93. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 246; see also, Helvering, supra note 28.
94. Id. at 243.
95. See 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH).
96. ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 249. It resulted in just a difference of $3,500, "a difference
which was obliterated by the transaction costs associated with marketing private placement
notes to third parties." Id.
97. Id.
98. Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 47-48 (for a complete explanation of option straddles).
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from the transaction and claimed an ordinary loss deduction 00 , which
he applied against ordinary income. In the second year, the taxpayer
engaged in a related transaction that resulted in a gain, which, not
coincidentally, equaled the loss incurred in the Year 1 transaction.
Thus, the transactions put the taxpayer in the same financial position
he was in prior to entering into them. However, the taxpayer deferred
the gain by entering into another related transaction.101 Thus, while
the offsetting transaction caused the taxpayer's non-tax economic posi-
tion to remain unchanged, the tax benefit-taking an ordinary loss
from the Year 1 transaction and deferring the offsetting gain-en-
riched him. In an opinion with no dissent, the Third Circuit Court
affirmed the Tax Court, which held that the transactions lacked eco-
nomic substance thereby denying the taxpayer the loss deduction. 102
c. Weller v. Commissioner103 - Purchase of Annuities
Financed by Debt
The taxpayer in Weller purchased an annuity and pledged it as
collateral to borrow funds. Weller then used the borrowed funds to pre-
pay interest on future borrowings and to repay the principal on the
earlier loans. The taxpayer claimed a deduction on the prepaid inter-
est. The Third Circuit disallowed the interest deduction on the grounds
that the transaction did not change the taxpayer's financial position
(actually used the words "appreciably change") even though the tax-
payer actually made payments satisfying the statutory definition of an
"amount paid . . . on indebtedness incurred . . . to purchase a single
premium life insurance contract."10 4
d. Gregory v. Helvering - Corporate Reorganization
Let us not forget Mrs. Gregory. Her economic position did not
change when she transferred one thousand shares of stock in Monitor
to a newly-formed Averill Corporation only to receive the same Monitor
shares back four days later when Averill liquidated. The values of the
shares remained the same at the time of the transfer and upon liquida-
tion. The Supreme Court disregarded the transaction even though the
100. I.R.C. § 165(c)(2).
101. See Lerman, 939 F.2d at 47-48 (for a detailed explanation of the transactions that
the taxpayer entered into).
102. Lerman, 939 F.2d at 56.
103. Weller v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 31 T.C. 33, affd, Weller v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959).
104. Weller, 270 F.2d at 298.
1332013
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1:113
taxpayer had created a "real, valid, corporate entity and carried out a
transaction that was within the terms of the statute."105
Now, if by some chance the courts find a change in the tax-
payer's economic position, it will be the courts who must decide on
whether the change was meaningful. Such a broad term cannot possi-
bly be defined in a statute, as the critics believe. To demand a
definition ignores prior case law where the courts have decided such an
issue. As in every fact-intensive case, whether the taxpayer's economic
position has changed in a meaningful way will depend on the facts and
circumstances. The drafters of section 7701(o) were not remiss by not
defining an un-definable term.
It is important to point out that the objective economic prong of
section 7701(o) does not require a showing of profit motive or profit
objective. The drafters of section 7701(o) should be lauded for not fol-
lowing the line of cases that focused on profit potential to determine
whether a It is important to point out that the objective economic
prong of section 7701(o) does not require a showing of profit motive or
profit objective. The drafters of section 7701(o) should be lauded for not
following the line of cases that focused on profit potential to determine
whether a transaction had economic substance. Not requiring the tax-
payer to show a profit objective respects and protects the integrity of
legitimate transactions.
First, it prevents tax motivated transactions which lack eco-
nomic substance from passing the objective prong of the test merely
because it can show profit potential.10 6 As the following case demon-
strates, profit potential does not necessarily mean it has economic
substance.
In Sala v. Commissioner,1 0 7 the taxpayer's wholly owned corpo-
ration, Solid Currencies, Inc., created Deerhurst GP partnership and
transferred foreign currency options to the partnership. The options
that the corporation contributed to the partnership actually had the
potential to earn net profits of $550,000108 over the course of one year.
105. Id. at 296-98.
106. See, e.g., Keeler v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1212, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe existence
of some potential for profit does not foreclose a finding of no economic substance."); Jackson
v. Comm'r, 966 F.2d 598, 601 (10th Cir. 1992) (We have never held that the mere presence
of an individual's profit objective will require us to recognize for tax purposes a transaction
which lacks economic substance.) (citing Cherin v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 986, 993 (1987));
Hariton, 52 Tax Law 235 ("The fact that a taxpayer derives substantial profit from an
investment will not prevent a court, however, from concluding that the investment did not
significantly alter the taxpayer's overall economic position.").
107. Sala v. Comm'r, 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010).
108. Id. at 1254.
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However, before such profits could be realized, after only a few weeks
of existence, the partnership liquidated before the end of the year and
reported a $60 million loss on its 2000 return. This $60 million "loss"
was offset against $60 million of income the taxpayer earned after ex-
ercising stock options which resulted in a zero tax liability for the
taxpayer and a tax savings of nearly $24 million. 109
As it turned out, generating profits was not the purpose of the acquisi-
tion and subsequent transfer of the options to the partnership. The
creation and subsequent transfer of the options to the partnership was
for the sole purpose of inflating the taxpayer's basis in the partnership
assets. The liquidation of the partnership before the end of the year
was planned and necessary in order to realize the substantial tax
loss. 110 Despite the potential profit the taxpayer could have realized
and in spite of the District Court's finding that Sala entered into the
transaction in order to make a profit, the Tenth Circuit found the
transaction failed the economic prong. 1'
Second, an economic substance test that is not based on profit
potential recognizes that some legitimate business transactions such
as certain leasing transactions, financing agreements, corporate reor-
ganizations, and sale-leasebacks inherently do not produce a pretax
profit, but nonetheless have economic substance. 112 A profits require-
ment would mean that these types of transactions would automatically
fail the objective prong of the economic substance test.113 The likely
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1251. The taxpayer relied on a rule set out in Helmer v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M
(CCH)727 (1975), holding that contingent obligations were not liabilities for purposes of
determining a partner's basis in the partnership. As a result, only half of the options that
were contributed to the partnership were added to the partnership basis plus an $8 million
cash investment for a total basis of $69 million. Upon liquidation, Solid received the $8
million cash plus $1 million in property. Thus, Solid's basis in the property was
approximately $61 million. Solid sold the property for under $1 million resulting in a tax
loss of over $60 million which the taxpayer claimed for the 2000 tax year.
111. Id. at 1254.
112. Sacks v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Where a transaction has
economic substance, it does not become a sham merely because it is likely to be unprofitable
on a pretax basis.").
113. Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of H.R. 5095 (The
American Competitiveness Act of 2002). 6 JCX-78-02 (July 19, 2002). ("[Rlequiring a pre-tax
profit test as part of an economic substance analysis could raise concerns with respect to
certain customary leveraged lease transactions, financing arrangements in general, and
transactions where the tax benefits are both intended by Congress and significant, but the
transaction itself is expected to yield little (if any) profit."); see Martin J. McMahon, Living
With the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine TAX NOTES TODAY, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY
158-2 (Aug. 17, 2010) ("The new statutory test recognizes that taxpayers often undertake
transactions related to their business that do not in isolation produce an identifiable profit
stream.").
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remedy to this problem would be for the Service to create a list of
transactions which inherently does not produce a profit be specifically
excluded from section 7701(o). Such a task is arduous to say the least
since it would require a constant updating of transactions that the Ser-
vice did not contemplate in the beginning. Thus, the remedy to the
problem in requiring a pretax profit test would only create more
problems.
Third, requiring a profits test would allow taxpayers to take ad-
vantage of code provisions which do not require a profit motive. In
other words, transactions which lack economic substance would be
shielded from the invocation of the economic substance doctrine merely
because the code provision specifically holds that a profit motive is not
required. Such a rule would allow taxpayers to claim loss deductions,
interest expenses, depreciation, or other tax benefits for transactions
that have no net effect on their financial positions. Moreover, it would
overturn prior case law that has applied the economic substance doc-
trine even though the code provision in which the taxpayer claimed the
tax benefit had no profit motive requirement. 114
Finally, not mandating a pretax profit also prevents the prob-
lem identified by noted scholar Alvin C. Warren:
The requirement of a pretax profit in [all] cases involves an inher-
ent dilemma because either the tax effect of a transaction turns on
the presence of some positive trivial pretax profit, or, if more than a
trivial pretax profit is necessary, there is no logical limitation on
the amount of such profit required, short of what the market would
command in such transactions if no tax benefits were involved. The
first branch of the dilemma that the pretax profit need only be posi-
tive is arbitrary because a very small economic profit will validate a
transaction that may be dominated by tax considerations, whereas
a very small economic loss will invalidate the same transaction. But
the second branch of the dilemma-requirement of a full market
return-is logically incoherent because it ignores the fact that the
capital markets will take preferential tax treatment into account in
setting relative prices. Finally, any intermediate position-such as
114. See Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d 21, 35 (1st. Cir. 1989) ("[A] taxpayer cannot deduct
a "sham transaction" loss, irrespective of his subjective profit motive."; Forseth v. Comm'r,
845 F.2d 746, 48 (7th Cir. 1988) (If a transaction lacks economic substance "then such
niceties as whether it was primarily for profit .. . are not involved."); Goldstein v. Comm'r,
364 F.2d 734, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1966) (The language of section 163 did not permit deductions
arising from a "transaction that has no substance ... aside from the taxpayer's desire to
obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction"); Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 92
(11th Cir. 1989) ("Once a court determines that a transaction is a sham, no further inquiry
into intent is necessary."); Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44, 53 ("[Ellimination of a profit
motive inquiry does not 'prevent the inquiry into the economic substance of [the taxpayer's
transaction]").
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requiring a 'reasonable pretax return' somewhere between a trivial
amount and a full market return-is unsatisfying because choice of
the intermediate position is also necessarily arbitrary.115
e. Section 7701(o) (2) (A) - Where the Taxpayer Chooses to
Rely on Profit
If the taxpayer chooses, he may rely on a profit objective to meet
the economic prong of section 7701(o). Section 7701(o)(2)(A) provides
that "the potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account
in determining whether [the transaction has economic substance] only
if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the ex-
pected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were
respected."11 6
At first blush, this section seems to promote the very abuses
mentioned earlier. However, a closer reading of section 7701(o)(2)(A)
shows that it runs in accord with section 7701(o)(1)(A) in that it looks
at whether the taxpayer's economic position has meaningfully
changed. Section 7701(o)(2)(A) merely provides guidance, a safe harbor
if you may, as to how the taxpayer can show a meaningful economic
change to pass the objective prong of section 7701(o).
Despite its title, section 7701(o)(2)A) is not a profits test per se,
in that it is not looking at how much of a profit was possible from the
transaction. Instead, this section is using the potential for pretax prof-
its and comparing them to the tax benefits. Thus, if the taxpayer's
potential for pretax profit is substantially greater than the net tax ben-
efits, then the transaction has changed the taxpayer's economic
position in a meaningful way. Put another way, regardless of how
much profit has been made from the transaction, if those net profits
are less than or not substantially greater than the tax benefits, the
taxpayer's economic position has not meaningfully changed. Thus, a $5
million pre-tax profit would fail the economics substance test if the tax
benefits were $50 million.
This comparison of pretax profits to tax benefits departs from
the line of cases which focused only on the amount of profit potential-
or lack thereof-resulting from the transaction itself and did not take
115. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated
Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981).
116. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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into consideration the tax savings that resulted from the tax
benefits." 7
f Brief History of the Pre-Tax Profits Test
While Gregory is known for the birthplace of the economic sub-
stance doctrine, the Supreme Court had no reason to address the issue
of profits. That opportunity came along in Knetsch where the Court
found that the taxpayer's transaction lacked economic substance be-
cause the transaction did not "appreciably affect [his] beneficial
interest except to reduce his tax." 18 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the Tax Court's decision in denying an interest deduction
in Goldstein v. Commissioneriz9 because the taxpayer "did not have
and could not reasonably have had any purpose or intention [in her]
transactions to appreciably affect her beneficial interest except to re-
duce her taxes."120
From a profits motive perspective in an economic substance
analysis the outcomes in cases like Knetsch and Goldstein were under-
standable and expected. But what if the taxpayers in Knetsch or
Goldstein actually made a profit? Would that have changed the out-
come? Did the lower courts infer from the Court's opinion in Knetsch
that as long as the taxpayer made a profit from the transaction it
would be respected entitling him to the corresponding tax benefit? The
answer to that question would come decades later in the form of a sale-
leaseback case, Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner.121
117. Hariton, supra note 24, at 48 (As one noted scholar noted: "Many tax practitioners
and even scholars, focusing on the mention of profit in cases . . . were until ACM v.
Commissioner, under the impression that what was required to avoid a disallowance of tax
benefits under the economic substance doctrine was a potential for profit from the relevant
transactions.").
118. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366.
119. 364 F.2d 734. The taxpayer claimed an $81,000 tax deduction because the
transaction she entered into failed to produce a profit. The Court of Appeals disallowed the
deduction finding that the only reason the taxpayer entered into the unprofitable venture
was for the interest deduction.
120. Goldstein v. Comm'r., 44 T.C. 284, 300 (1965) (Taxpayer won $140,000 in a
sweepstakes in 1958. Upon the advice of her son, she borrowed $945,000 from two banks
and purchased Treasury Notes worth $1 million. The loans were subject to a 4% interest
rate ($30,000/year), while the rate of return on the Treasury notes would be no more than
1.5% (roughly 10,500/year) Thus, the transaction projected a $19,500 loss (and an actual
loss of $25,019). Taxpayer prepaid $81,396.61 in interest and claimed a deduction in the
same amount. As a result of the interest expense deduction, Mrs. Goldstein lowered her tax
liability from $69,600 to $23,014.04 (total tax savings of roughly $46,000)).
121. Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
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In Rice's Toyota, the taxpayer (Rice) entered into a sale-and-
leaseback with Finalco, a leasing company. Rice purportedly purchased
a used computer from Finalco for $1,455,227, financing it with a
$250,000 recourse note, payable over 3 years, and two nonrecourse
notes totaling $1,205,227 to be paid over an eight-year period.12 2 At the
time of the transaction, the computer was valued at $1,297,643.123 Rice
leased the computer back to Finalco for eight years, who subsequently
subleased the computer to another company for five years.124 This ben-
efited Rice because Finalco would only become obligated to pay rent on
the lease if it received sufficient rent through subleasing the com-
puter. 125 Rice timely paid off its $250,000 recourse note at the end of
the three-year agreement along with $30,000 in interest for a total in
payments of $280,000.126 At the time of the payoff of the recourse note,
Rice recovered $30,000 of his investment through the rental payments
made by Finalco as a result of payments from the sub-lessee. Rice
could expect another $20,000 for the following two years from rent pay-
ments made by the sub-lessee to Finalco. However, with respect to the
remaining $230,000 that Rice had actually invested, it could only re-
cover that amount if Finalco was either successful in subleasing the
computer to another third party after the initial five-year period ex-
pired, or if Rice sold the computer for a substantial sum. Neither was
likely to happen since Finalco would be entitled to 30 percent market-
ing fee for re-leasing the computer 27 and the value of the computer
upon purchase would be less than the amount Rice paid for it.128 Rice
did not bother to consider this problem. As it was, Rice was solely in-
terested in the accelerated depreciation deductions and interest
payments that he would take.129 During the years before the trial, Rice
claimed depreciation and interest deductions totaling $1,040,415.93 for
a total tax savings of over $350,000.1ao The tax savings exceeded the
$230,000 of his unrecovered investment.
122. Id. at 91.
123. Id. ("Finalco had recently purchased the used computer for $1,297,643).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91.
127. Id. at 92.
128. Id. at 93 (Rice purchased the computer for $1,297,643 at a time when the computer
was valued at under $1 million. The Tax Court inferred from this transaction that Rice paid
more than the computer was worth because he planned "to abandon the transaction down
the road by walking away from the nonrecourse note balance before the transaction ran its
stated course").
129. Id.
130. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 81 T.C. 184, 195 (1983), affd in part, rev'd in part,
Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d 89.
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The Commissioner disallowed the deductions. The Tax Court,
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, sustained the Commissioner's determi-
nation because there the taxpayer had no "reasonable possibility of
profit."1 3 1 The Tax Court applied this "reasonable possibility of profit"
standard in subsequent cases and the standard was adopted by many
circuits. 132
While there have not been many critics of the comparison test
under section 7701(o)(2)(A), there are a number of who complain that
some of the terms within that section are vague. In particular, critics
argue that section 7701(o)(2)(A) does not specifically define "pre-tax
profit or "reasonably expected tax benefit." Nor does it provide gui-
dance on how to determine present value or what discount rate should
be applied. Moreover, they want to know what that drafters meant by
the term "substantial."133
These critics seem to forget that such issues were left to the
courts to resolve and should continue to rest with the courts. For exam-
ple, the issue of what constitutes "substantial" cannot be answered by
the statute, but will be based on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Indeed, when the standard was a reasonable possibil-
ity of profit, the courts were not always on one accord in determining
131. Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91.
132. See Klamath Strategies, 568 F.3d at 545 ("The proper focus is on whether the loan
transactions presented a reasonable possibility of profit."); Black & Decker, 436 F.3d 431,
41-42 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Economic substance inquiry requires an objective determination of
whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed apart from tax
benefits."); IES Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[The application
of the objective economic substance test [involves determining]. . . whether there was a
'reasonable possibility of profit... apart from tax benefits.'"); Hunt v. Comm'r, 938 F.2d 466,
472 (4th Cir. 1991); Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1990) (The
transaction "fail[edl to yield any reasonable expectation of a profit"); Friedman v. Comm'r,
869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989); Gefen v. Comm'r, 87 T.C 1471(Tax Court acknowledged
transaction had "economic substance because the record. . . establish[ed] that the
Partnership's transactions offered a reasonable opportunity for economic profit."); Estate of
Thomas v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 412, 438 (holding that a transaction has economic substance and
will be recognized for tax purposes if the transaction offers a "realistic opportunity for
economic profit which would justify the form of the transaction".) (citing Rice's Toyota v.
Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 202-3 and n. 17, affd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89); James v.
Comm'r, 87 T.C. 905, 924 (The transactions . . . were structured so that no prospect of
achieving a non-tax profit from the transactions existed at the time the [transactions were]
entered into . . . "); Bridges v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 1064 (1963). For a detailed history, see
generally Warren, Jr., supra note 119; Yoram Keinan, The Profit Motive Requirement Under
the Economic Substance Doctrine 21 J. TAX'N INv. 81 (Oct. 2003).
133. See McMahon, supra note 117 ("There is, however, little authority explaining how
to balance tax benefits against pre-tax profits in determining whether a transaction meets
the objective prong of the economic substance test.").
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what constituted a reasonable profit, ranging from "any" profit'3 4 to a
"meaningful" profit. 35
Comparing the potential pretax profits to the tax benefits is cer-
tainly a stricter test than the possibility of profits test. However, for
the reasons stated in an earlier section concerning the abuses that may
arise with a profits test, section 7701(o)(2)(A) is a better standard to
test a transaction for economic substance. Incidentally, this standard
has already been used in recent court cases. 36
2. Second Prong: Substantial Business Purpose
The second prong of the economic substance test requires that
the taxpayer have a substantial non-tax business purpose for entering
into the transaction. This is not a difficult hurdle to overcome, as many
taxpayers will testify that they reasonably believed the transaction
had profit potential. The low threshold for this prong may explain why
opponents have not criticized it compared to the first prong. The only
criticism it has received is the statute's failure to define what consti-
tutes a substantial purpose. My response to this criticism is the same
as earlier, what constitutes a "substantial purpose" will be based on
facts and circumstances and decided on a case by case basis.
134. See Keinan, supra note 132, at n. 10 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 250 F. Supp.
2d 748 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States., 167 F. Supp. 2d. 298
(D.D.C. 2001), rev'd 314 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rice's Toyota World, 81 T.C. at 207 ("As
shown by the financial calculations and using even the most optimistic forecasts, the
transaction in the case before us could not prove profitable."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 752
F.2d 89; Thomas v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
135. See Keinan, supra note 132, at n. 9-10 ("In transactions in which the taxpayer
makes a financial investment, courts generally look for a non-de minimis, realistic potential
for profit to determine whether there is a change in the taxpayer's economic position. In
recent years, various courts indicated that any profit is sufficient, while a few required the
profit to be more than nominal."). Other courts stated there needed to be more than a
"peppercorn of economics".
136. See Sala, 613 F.3d at 1254 ("Additionally, while the district court found the long
and short options had a potential to earn profits of $550,000 over the course of one year, the
expected tax benefit was nearly $24 million. That expected tax benefit [$24 million]
dwarfled] any potential gain [$550,000] . . . such that 'the economic realities of the
transaction were insignificant in relation to the tax benefits of the transaction.'"); Jade
Trading, LLC, 598 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[Al disproportionate tax advantage as
compared to the amount invested and potential return [ I] compel a conclusion that the . . .
transaction objectively lacked economic substance."); K2 Trading Ventures, LLC v. United
States, 101 F.3d Cl. 365, 382 (2011) ("[T]he high ratio of tax benefits to maximum potential
profit indicates that the transactions were designed only to produce disproportionate tax
benefits.").
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Strict Liability Penalty
What critics of codification dislike more than section 7701(o) is
the strict liability tax penalty. In addition to disliking the fact that tax-
payers cannot offer up a defense, it is also reviled because it is based on
the amount of tax saved (underpayment in tax) as opposed to the
amount reported, which in most cases would be a smaller amount.'37
The purpose of the strict liability penalty is to force taxpayers to
think prior to engaging in transactions that reap tax benefits that are
too good to be true. Given the fact that such tax motivated transactions
have saved corporations millions of dollars in taxes, a strict liability
penalty is the best way to halt them.
If section 7701(o) applied to all transactions then the dissatis-
faction with the strict liability penalty would be understandable.
However, as explained earlier in this article, the economic substance
doctrine has always been applied against questionable transactions,
i.e. tax shelters. Fighting tax shelters without an accompanying
mandatory penalty will always result in a loss for the government.
Penalties that can be avoided by showing reasonable cause-which is
generally a tax opinion letter from the tax advisor-is not a deter-
rent. 138 Imposing a strict liability penalty will certainly curb the
aggressive tax shelters. In other words, the strict liability penalty
should only result in a chilling effect for tax motivated transactions,
not legitimate business transactions.1 3 9
137. See Alison Baker, Economic Substance Could be Prominent Issue for IRS, Courts,
Congress, 10 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) S-18 No. 10 (2010). see also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAx PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 1
(2009), available at http://www.aicpa.org/Press/PressReleases/2009/Downloadable
Documents/AICPA-report-civil-tax-penalty-reform.pdf ("overbroad, vaguely defined, and
disproportionate penalties, particularly those administered as a part of a system that
automatically imposes penalties or that otherwise fails to provide basic due process
safeguards, create an atmosphere of arbitrariness and unfairness that is likely to
discourage voluntary compliance.").
138. See Martin J. McMahon, Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st
Century Tax Shelters, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 52-35 (Mar. 18, 2003) ("The efforts of the IRS
to combat this new wave of tax shelters through a program based on mandatory disclosure
of certain transactions, coupled with settlements without penalties for certain voluntary
disclosures do not appear to be working overwhelmingly well.").
139. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CODIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
AND RELATED PENALTIES (Sept. 14, 2010) available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Codification-of-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties. The Service issued an
LB&I Directive, LMSB-20-0910-024 requiring review and approval by the Director of Field
Operations of any proposed strict liability penalty as a result of failing the two-prong
economic substance test under section 7701(o).
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 7701(o) is not inherently flawed as the critics suggest.
The decision not to provide further guidance with respect to the appli-
cation of the economic substance test will not result in taxpayer
uncertainty and a halt in normal business practices. If nothing else, it
brings about certainty to the taxpayer, as well as to the government
and the courts as to how to apply the proper test. Taxpayers engaging
in legitimate transactions should feel comfortable continuing with such
transactions. The questions that the critics demand from the govern-
ment such as what constitutes a "meaningful change" and
"substantial," will be answered by the proper authority-the courts.
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